Behavioral economics presents a "paternalistic" rationale for intervention by a benevolent government. This paper studies the desirability of various forms of collective action when government decisions are determined via the political process in response to votes by time inconsistent voters. We consider an economy where the only "distortion" is the agents' time inconsistency. We …rst examine a fully decentralized economy where agents can make private "investments" in a commitment technology. We show that the demand for commitment is non monotone with the degree of time inconsistency, with agents with intermediate intensity of present bias exhibiting the highest value of commitment. We then study several forms of collective action. If only commitment decisions are centralized, commitment investment is often more moderate than if all decisions are centralized. Welfare consequences of full centralization (of both commitment and consumption decisions) are ambiguous and depend on the distribution of time inconstistency in the population.
Introduction
Traditional public economics provides e¢ ciency rationales for government intervention that are commonly founded in payo¤ or information externalities. In particular, none of these rationales justify government policy in areas in which agents make private decisions that have limited impact on other agents. The behavioral economics literature has introduced a novel justi…cation for government intervention arising from "paternalistic attitudes."
1 Roughly, a paternalistic government is a benevolent planner who designs policy to help agents make better decisions. This form of paternalism is controversial, partly because it drastically departs from standard normative economics. 2 Our approach is di¤erent. Just as for textbook public policy analysis, it is useful to consider what happens when we abandon the idea of a benevolent planner and instead explicitly model the fact that the political process determines the design of policy. Will politicians seeking election exploit/indulge the voters'behavioral distortions? Are behavioral distortions amenable to aggregation into collective action? What are the implications for the constitutional scope of government activity? There are of course many types of behavioral distortions, and each of those may lead to its own collective action environment. We focus here on time inconsistency: agents have preferences that display present-bias or quasi-hyperbolic discounting a-la Phelps and Polak (1968) and Laibson (1997) . 3 Because of this time inconsistency, agents may display self-control problems that lead to phenomena such as procrastination (doing things too late), preproperation (doing things too early) (see O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999), insu¢ cient savings for retirement (Laibson et al. 1998) , harmful obesity and addictions Pesendorfer 2007, O'Donoghue and Rabin 2000) , etc. These self-control problems also identify a demand for commitment (rehab clinics, illiquid assets with costly withdrawals, and so on) that cannot arise with exponential discounting. In particular, a benevolent government could, in principle, o¤er commitment instruments that would help the electorate overcome some of the harmful symptoms of time inconsistency. Time inconsistency and commitment problems have been the focus of a large literature in political economy and macroeconomics. There is evidence that such problems have a¤ected the design and the history of pension systems. These phenomena have also been suggested as important for thinking about government debt and monetary policy. 4 In this literature time inconsistency of political choices emerges from the interaction among time consistent agents who act at di¤erent points in time. Our analysis complements this literature by studying the consequences of having agents with heterogeneous amounts of time inconsistency participate in the political process. For instance, a public pension system is sometimes defended as a desirable solution to a potential problem of under-saving due to self-control problems. 5 However, the design of such a system should then take into account the political constraints generated by these same self-control problems. For example, this may a¤ect the choice between a pay as you go system and a funded system, the kind of safeguards that are designed into the system, as well as the timing and evolution of the system. Once we depart from a world in which policy is determined by hypothetical benevolent social planners, the set of feasible outcomes is constrained by the political incentives faced by politicians, or by the bargaining protocols that govern collective action. Time inconsistency o¤ers a simple case study for us to illustrate how political forces driven by 'behavioral' voters may induce outcomes that di¤er substantially from those o¤ered by a benevolent social planner. In fact, we show that political competition may lead to suboptimal choices of commitment instruments. The observation that merely allowing for commitment instruments is no panacea, that the underlying political process needs to be accounted for, leads us to a comparison of constitutional arrangements. In the setting of time inconsistency, an important dimension of this comparison of political institutions relates quite naturally to the classic problem regarding the optimal degree of centralization of resource allocation.
Speci…cally, we study a simple Wicksellian tree-cutting problem, under the standard speci…cation that the tree is growing in value over time. In our baseline setting, agents have the option of cutting a tree at period 2; which generates a value of v 2 ; or at period 3; which generates a value of v 3 ; where v 3 > v 2 : A tension arises since agents exhibit present bias. At any period, all future periods are discounted with a factor of 1: Thus, from the perspective of period 1; agents prefer to wait till period 3 to cut the tree. But when period 2 arrives, agents compare an immediate value of v 2 with a discounted value of v 3 and could potentially prefer to cut the tree early. This type of problem has been studied by O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) , who show that time inconsistent agents tend to consume (cut the tree) ine¢ ciently early, and that these agents would …nd it valuable to be able to commit to cut the tree later than they would absent commitment.
We modify the O'Donoghue-Rabin model to allow for continuous choices and costly commitment: by investing resources in period 1, agents can make it costly for their future selves to depart from some pre-speci…ed plan of action. The more investment there is early on in commitment, the costlier it is for future selves to cut the tree too early.
We …rst consider a fully decentralized environment, a benchmark case in which government plays no role. We show that preferences for investing in commitment are non monotonic in the strength of present bias, and that these preferences may not be single-peaked. Agents with severe present bias (very low parameters) require large investments in commitment in order to alter the timing of future consumption: commitment may be too expensive for these individuals. On the other hand, agents who exhibit mild present bias (very high parameters) are able to postpone consumption even absent commitment instruments: commitment is unnecessary for these individuals. Consequently, when all decisions are decentralized, extreme agents on both sides of the spectrum choose little or no investment in commitment, while moderate agents choose more substantial investments.
We then introduce collective action. We assume collective decisions are arrived at through a competition between two o¢ ce-seeking candidates. We outline three di¤erent scenarios that vary in terms of which choices (investment in commitment and/or the timing of consumption) are subject to the political process, and which ones are left to individuals. We believe these scenarios o¤er a simple taxonomy for an array of plausible environments. They also help highlight the sensitivity of generated welfare levels to the aspects, or timing, of choices in which collective action comes into play. 6 Suppose …rst that commitment decisions are decentralized, while allocation decisions, regarding when to cut the tree, are taken by a centralized government through a voting mechanism. More concretely, in the second period each of the two candidates o¤ers a platform specifying the fraction of the tree that they would cut in that period and majority vote determines which platform gets implemented. The median is decisive and determines the equilibrium amount of tree-cutting in the second period. However, no individual makes any investment in commitment: government intervention completely undermines incentives to invest in commitment because of free riding in commitment investments. Agents know that their individual commitment decisions have no e¤ect on the allocation decision that results from the voting mechanism, and therefore have no incentive to invest in commitment. Nonetheless, if the median agent is not prone to a strong present-bias, i.e., the decisive agent is virtuous, the political process would lead to delayed consumption and high welfare levels. 6 We abuse terminology by referring to "welfare"as the utilitarian social surplus measured for the period 1 selves of the voters. We acknowledge that other criteria are relevant and we discuss this more explicitly in Section 6.
If, in contrast, the median agent is prone to a strong present bias, consumption would occur early and the process would be particularly ine¢ cient.
Consider next the case in which allocation decisions are taken privately in a decentralized manner, but commitment decisions are centralized. I.e., the two candidates compete in period 1 (via majority rule) over platforms specifying the levels of commitment. This scenario is a natural way to think of many applications as commitment decisions might involve, for instance, setting up …nes for consuming savings (say, retirement savings) too early, prohibition legislation, etc. Analysis of this case is more subtle because of the non monotonic amount of commitment desired in the population, and since it is possible that preferences are not singlepeaked. Equilibrium outcomes depend crucially on the characteristics of the commitment technology. A pure strategy equilibrium may not exist, and even when it does, because of the non monotonicity of ideal levels of commitment, the decisive voter is typically not the agent with the median present-bias parameter. When a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist, we show that there is a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria with a two-point support. The equilibrium with minimal commitment level places a 50% probability of zero investment in commitment. The maximal one places 50% probability on the level of commitment that provides zero value of commitment for a marginal voter. The generated welfare levels in this setting are always dominated by those generated in the fully decentralized setting. Indeed, in the fully decentralized environment nothing prevents agents from privately choosing the level of commitment that emerges in the centralized commitment scenario.
The last system we consider is one that is fully centralized, where both commitment levels and the timing of consumption are decided upon collectively. In this case, the median present-bias voter determines both decisions. When collectively deciding on commitment investments, voters aim at providing commitment for the median voter in the subsequent period. In contrast with the decentralized consumption scenarios, where the desired commitment levels are non monotone in , in the fully centralized environment these desired commitment levels are increasing in . In equilibrium, positive commitment may take place if the median voter is su¢ ciently moderate, and the population inherits the virtues or biases of its median voter. As a consequence, when the median voter exhibits a weak but substantial preference bias, this system generates the highest welfare levels. Indeed, when commitment decisions are decentralized, the median voter would still opt for early consumption. Thus, in this case full centralization allows the electorate to tailor commitment levels to the median voter, who does not require very costly commitment investments in order to delay consumption.
The comparison among these scenarios with di¤ering degrees and timing of centralization, shows that the welfare consequences of government intervention are fairly nuanced when we take into account the fact that behavioral agents are also political actors, electing the government that is charged with "solving"their behavioral biases. Thus, for instance, outcomes can be worse under centralization than those generated by a laissez faire economy in which all decisions are decentralized. However, particular forms of intervention can be useful. Welfare consequences are sensitive both to the distribution of preferences in the electorate, and to the precise timing in which government intervenes. In particular, when the median voter is not prone to strong present biases, interventions under which the timing of consumption is decided upon collectively are welfare enhancing. They allow the electorate to e¤ectively delegate decisions to a virtuous median voter.
Related Literature
Some authors (Benjamin and Laibson 2003 , Caplan 2007 , Glaeser 2006 , Rizzo and Whitman 2009 have informally made the point that when government is not run by a benevolent social planner but by politicians in ‡uenced by voting decisions, it is not clear that government intervention is bene…cial. In fact, Glaeser and Caplan explicitly make the case that, if voters are boundedly rational, then the case for limited government may be even stronger than in standard models.
7 Krusell et al. (2002 Krusell et al. ( , 2010 examine government policy for agents who su¤er self-control problems. Krusell et al. (2002) consider a neoclassical growth model with quasi-hyperbolic consumers. They show that, when government is benevolent but cannot commit, decentralized allocations are Pareto superior. This is due to a general equilibrium e¤ect of savings that exacerbates an under-saving problem. Benabou and Tirole (2006) discuss how endogenously biased beliefs that are chosen by individuals for self-motivation can generate a belief in a just (unjust) world and ultimately a¤ect redistributive politics. As mentioned earlier, the current paper is also related to the literature on dynamic inconsistency of political-economic decision making (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 1990, Alesina and . In those models, voters are time consistent, but the identity of the decision maker (or decisive voter) changes over time, generating time inconsistent policies. This in turn creates an incentive for early decision makers to manipulate state variables, such as debt, in order to in ‡uence subsequent decisions. Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2011) studies a model of …scal irresponsibility and public debt in the presence of time inconsistent voters. The model they consider captures environments where it is either impossible for government to help agents to achieve commitments or it is positively harmful for the government to do so. Their model does not quite …t into any of the scenarios that we discuss in this paper, but does highlight the potential harmful effects government intervention may have in the realm of …scal policy when voters exhibit time inconsistencies. In fact, the paper o¤ers a new rationale for balanced budget rules in constitutions as they restrain governments'responses to voters'desires. 8 Hwang and Mollerstrom (2012) study political reform with time inconsistent voters and show that gradualism emerges in equilibrium as a consequence of time inconsistency. They also show that election of a patient agenda setter can arise in equilibrium.
A Tree Cutting Model

Preferences and Consumption Possibilities
A continuum of agents decides collectively on the timing of consumption. There are three periods. In period 1 agents make "commitment"decisions (that we specify below). In periods 2 and 3 agents consume fractions of a "tree" of growing value. The tree is worth v 2 in period 2, and v 3 in period 3. We assume that v 2 < v 3 . 9 In period 2 agents choose a fraction x of the tree to consume in period 2, with 1 x remaining to be consumed in period 3. We interpret period 3 as the natural moment of maturity of the tree so that there is an extra cost in cutting part of the tree in period 2. This cost is given by the function k (x; c), where c is a parameter that is determined in the …rst period. We assume that @k(x;c) @x 0;
@k(x;c) @c
That is, cutting costs are weakly increasing and convex in the amount of the tree that is cut x and in the extent of commitment in place, as given by the commitment parameter c: The marginal cost of early consumption is also increasing in the commitment parameter c. Furthermore, we assume that k (0; c) = k(x; 0) = 0 for all x and c:
Agents have preferences. That is, for any payo¤s u 2 and u 3 in periods 2 and 3;
8 Gottlieb (2008) studies the optimal design of nonexclusive contracts when …rms compete over time inconsistent consumers. The paper the asymmetry between immediate-costs goods and immediate-rewards goods that are generated by nonexclusivity. To the extent that …rms are akin to political competitors, some of the underlying forces in that paper are relevant for the study of political processes with a time inconsistent electorate. 9 Our qualitative results remain in the presence of uncertainty over future tree values.
respectively, the assessed utility at time t; denoted by U t , is given by:
We assume that the parameter is distributed according to a continuous distribution G[0; 1] in the population with a median parameter of M .
An agent with parameter has a utility at t = 2 given by:
In period 1 a parameter c is chosen (by a collective action process that we soon specify). This parameter raises the cost of cutting the tree early: we assume that k (x; c) is increasing in c for all x. Thus, c serves as a commitment mechanism to delay consumption to period 3. This commitment is costly in period 1: choosing c costs I (c) ; where we assume I(0) = 0; I 0 (0) = 0; I 0 (c) 0; and I 00 (c) > 0 for all c. 10 Utility in period 1 is given by
Agents are assumed to be sophisticated, in the sense that they are aware that they are time inconsistent. O'Donoughue and Rabin (1999) analyzed the single person decision problem in this environment, by using the notion of perception perfect equilibrium. When agents are sophisticated, this boils down to preferences that are speci…ed a-la Strotz (1955) who perform backwards induction. We assume sophistication because we want to study how the demand for commitment is mediated by the political system.
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For notational simplicity, we assume = 1 for the remainder of the analysis. This assumption is e¤ectively without loss of generality (as discounting can be encoded in the v sequence of tree values).
The Political Process
There are two candidates running for o¢ ce. Candidates are o¢ ce motivated, receiving some positive payo¤s from each electoral victory. It will be clear that candidates' time preferences play no role. 12 We assume that the electorate has no ideological attachment to 10 The assumption that I(0) = 0 is not restrictive. Indeed, assuming I(0) > 0 is tantamount to assuming there is a …xed cost to entering our economy. 11 We return to a discussion of the impact of naievete in our setting in the Conclusions. 12 This is not to say that time inconsistencies cannot take place directly at the political level. As mentioned in the discussion of the related literature, there is abody of work that focuses on time consistency of government policy. There is also work (e.g., Laguno¤, 2008) that shows that, if one considers governments that have policy preferences and that know that they may be kicked out of o¢ ce with positive probability, endogenous present bias may emerge.
the candidates. In Appendix B, we allow agents to have idiosyncratic ideological preferences (as in Lindbeck and Weibull 1987) . We distinguish between three types of environments. These are meant to capture di¤erent collective action settings and highlight the e¤ects of the timing of collective decisions on commitment choices.
Centralized commitment, Centralized choice. Elections occur in periods t = 1; 2: At t = 1, each candidate o¤ers a platform consisting of a cost c that determines the cost of consumption in period 2 later on. Majority voting determines which outcome, and corresponding platform, is elected (we assume that ties are broken with a toss of a coin). All agents experience an immediate commitment cost of I(c) at t = 1: At t = 2; the candidates each o¤er a fraction x of the tree to be consumed in period 2 and majority rule (with random breaking of ties) determines which policy is implemented. If an amount x of the tree is consumed at t = 2; an agent with taste parameter receives the value of v 2 x + v 3 (1 x): All agents experience an immediate cost of k(x; c):
Dentralized commitment, Centralized choice. At t = 1; agents choose individually the parameter c that will induce their commitment-breaking costs at time t = 2, the cost of which is immediate and given by I(c). At t = 2; fraction x of the tree to be consumed in period 2 and majority rule (with random breaking of ties) determines which policy is implemented for the entire population. An individual with taste parameter who chose a commitment parameter of c at t = 1 receives a net value of v 2 x + v 3 (1 x) and experiences an immediate cost of k(x; c):
Centralized commitment, Decentralized choice. Elections occur only in period t = 1, when each candidate o¤ers a platform consisting of a commitment parameter c involving an immediate commitment cost of I(c). Majority voting determines which outcome, and corresponding platform is elected (again, ties are broken randomly). At t = 2; each of the individual agents decides what fraction x of the tree to consume. An individual with taste parameter who chooses to consume a fraction x of the tree t = 2 receives a net value of v 2 x + v 3 (1 x) and experiences an immediate cost of k(x; c):
Notice that had commitment been free, all agents that would naturally consume early in period 2 would commit themselves to later consumption. Consequently, decentralized decisions would lead to …rst-best outcomes in which all agents would e¢ ciently and fully delay their consumption. The introduction of commitment costs introduces a non-trivial cost-bene…t trade-o¤ in decentralized economies, that we soon analyze, which creates room for potentially bene…cial government intervention.
Decentralized Outcomes
Before inspecting the impacts of collective action on commitment decisions, we describe each agent's individual decisions. This analysis corresponds to the case in which all decisions are made in a decentralized fashion.
Given the value of c determined in the …rst period, in the second period the agent's problem is given by:
Let x (c; ) denote the solution to this problem.
(1) Intuitively, whenever the agent either experiences less present bias or higher marginal costs of immediate consumption, delay is more likely. At the extremes, if marginal costs of cutting the whole tree are not too high (namely, @k(1;c) @x < v 2 ), very impatient agents will not delay any consumption. Virtuous agents, for whom the marginal costs of very little early consumption outweigh the bene…ts, will cut the entire tree in period 3: The monotonicity of the consumption function x(c; ) is captured by the following lemma, which will be useful for our analysis of the collective choice settings.
Lemma 1 (Consumption Monotonicity) The fraction of the tree consumed in period 2;
x(c; ); is decreasing in both c and :
Assume that the fundamentals are such that x(c; ) is di¤erentiable with respect to both c and whenever positive. The …rst period problem can then be written as:
Let c ( ) be the solution of this problem. We want to understand the dependence of the commitment parameter c( ) on , will be an essential input into the collective action problem. In order to glean some intuition on the dependence of c on ; suppose that fundamentals are such that x(c; ) is di¤erentiable with respect to c: Notice that:
In contrast to the standard dynamic optimization problem with geometric discounters, the envelope condition fails and the indirect e¤ect on period 2 consumption does not disappear. Indeed, substituting the second period …rst-order conditions we obtain:
There are several e¤ects of changes in on the optimal choice of c. As increases more weight is put on the future, pushing for more investment now. Furthermore, the fraction of the tree consumed in period 2; x (c; ) ; is smaller, leading to a smaller marginal cost @k(x(c; );c) @c tomorrow. Nonetheless, time inconsistency is less relevant, so the bene…t of (1 ) v 3 is smaller. When is close to zero or close to
period 1 investment will be zero, so investment is not monotone. Intuitively, agents for whom time inconsistency is very severe foresee that reasonably priced commitments will not save them from excessive consumption in period 2 and therefore acquire limited commitment. On the other side of the spectrum, agents for whom time inconsistency is very weak, do not su¤er from great temptation in period 2 and therefore do not require extreme commitment to enable them to postpone consumption.
In general, c( ) can achieve several local maxima between 0 and
The following example illustrates a case in which c( ) is concave in this region and only one maximum exists. . The second period utility is then given by:
and the corresponding …rst-order condition requires that:
Notice that x(c; ) is decreasing in ;achieving the maximal value of 1 when = 0:
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This generates a second period utility of:
13 In particular, our speci…cation of the cost function k(x; c) assures that consumption is interior for 2 (0; Plugging these values into period 1's objective function yields:
The optimum is given by:
where 1 ; 2 ; 3 are positive constants depending on v 2 and v 3 ; while P k ( ) is a polynomial of degree k in (with coe¢ cients determined by v 2 and v 3 ). Figure 1 illustrates the emerging result of c( ): As highlighted by the …gure, the greatest commitment constraints are chosen by individuals with moderate levels of time inconsistency.
Electoral Outcomes
We now turn to inspect the e¤ects of collective action on agents' choices. We start by analyzing the case in which only the choice of commitment levels is done through an electoral process. We then proceed to a case in which both commitment and the timing of consumption are decided upon collectively.
Collective Commitment with Decentralized Choice
In this setting, the commitment parameter c is determined collectively. From the point of view of an agent of type , the voting problem is determined as follows. From the analysis of the private decision problem of an agent of type , if a commitment parameter c is chosen, and subsequent choices are made optimally by the agent, period 1 utility is given by
Thus, the agent votes for candidate 1 o¤ering commitment c 1 over candidate 2, who o¤ers commitment c 2 ; whenever
Proposition 1 Assume that
There is a unique pure strategy equilibrium of the collective commitment game in which both candidates o¤er a platform c CD .
Furthermore, when c( ) has a unique local maximum in 0;
; the platform c CD corresponds to the ideal policy for a voter of type CD , where CD is higher than the median ;
The quadratic case in the example above is useful in illustrating the intuition underlying Proposition 1. Consider Figure 1 . If 1 G(
1=2; there is a majority of agents who prefer no commitment and the equilibrium commitment parameter is naturally c CD = 0;
which coincides with that preferred by the median. Otherwise, for everyc > 0; de…ne L (c) and H (c) such thatc is their ideal point, i.e. c( L (c)) = c( H (c)) =c. All agents with preference parameters below L (c) and above H (c) prefer commitment parameters lower thanc, while agents with preference parameters between L (c) and H (c) prefer preference parameters abovec: In particular, the equilibrium commitment parameter c CD is chosen so that these two classes of agents are of equal proportions. That is,
CD and the result follows. In fact, note that in this case the equilibrium commitment level corresponds to a voter of type CD that is strictly higher than the median,
14 This construction of the equilibrium level of commitment can be adapted to environments in which c( ) entails several local maxima, it is only the relation to the median agent's preferred level of commitment that hinges on c( ) having a unique maximum. However, the construction does rely on all agents having single-peaked preferences with respect to the 14 The construction suggests that median preserving spreads of the distribution G would lead to lower equilibrium commitment levels. commitment parameter c: Indeed, in this case, agents with high taste parameter prefer no investment in commitment, while all others prefer a positive amount of commitment. The condition on @k(1;c) @x assure that even individuals with very low parameters bene…t from some level of commitment.
When preferences are not single-peaked, this analysis breaks down. This case arises when @k(1;c) @x < v 2 for some c, and a policy of no commitment is a local optimum for most 's. We will now outline what happens when preferences are not single peaked by considering the special case of linear costs. This case is useful since its structure is rather simple.
When consumption costs are linear, we can normalize the problems' fundamentals so that k (x; c) = cx. Furthermore, the optimal choice in the second period is generically either x = 0 or x = 1. In case of indi¤erence, we will assume that an agent breaks the indi¤erence to favor her "commitment self,"i.e., she chooses x = 0.
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Suppose that in period 1 a cost c was chosen, and consider the period 2 choice problem of a voter of type . She will wait until time 3 if and only if
Thus, as before, agents with >
are not willing to pay for commitment: they do not …nd it necessary.
Commitment is perceived bene…cial in period 1 if the delay in consumption due to commitment is worth its costs I(c): That is, whenever there is a commitment parameter c such that:
How do investment incentives vary with ? It is very di¢ cult (and costly) to make low agents wait until period three to consume. On the other side of the spectrum, high agents are virtuous and will wait till period 3 even with no commitment instruments. Therefore, investment only pays for intermediate 's.
Thus, as in the case studied previously, incentives to invest are not monotonic in since both low and high 's dislike investment (for di¤erent reasons). However, unlike the previous case, utilities are not single-peaked with respect to the commitment c: for intermediate 's payo¤s are …rst decreasing in c because we violate condition (2) and so commitment 15 This setting can be …t a special case of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001 , 2007 type of preferences.
Namely, suppose that two functions govern an individual's utility from consumption: u(x) is the direct utility of x; while v(y) is the temptation cost of not having consumed y available at the time of choice. In such a setting, in order to delay consumption in period 2; u (v 3 ) v (v 2 ) u (v 2 ) : Suppose u(x) = x and u(y) = y; where > 0: Then delayed consumption in period 3 occurs when v 3 v 2 (1 + ); which is analogous to our linear costs case when taking = initially a¤ects utility only through its costs, but carries no bene…ts in terms of the timing of consumption, until we reach a level of commitment c such that condition (2) is satis…ed, so that c = 0 and c = c are both local optima.
Recall that for all agents of preference parameter
, there is no willingness to pay for commitment no matter what the commitment technology is. We denote by H v 2 v 3 . If 1 G( H ) 1=2; there is a majority supporting no commitment and, as before, there is a unique equilibrium in which both candidates o¤er commitment c CD = 0: Suppose there is a substantial fraction of the population that is moderate, 1 G( H ) < 1=2: Now note that by raising c we obtain an increasing mass of 0 s for which v 3 v 2 c. Let (c)
. The mass is given by G ( (c)) . De…ne c L such that
and let L (c L ). Letc be the unique commitment level such that
The next result characterizes the equilibria in this environment.
Proposition 2 Assume that k (x; c) = cx.
I (c L ), there exists a unique equilibrium with investment of zero in commitment instruments.
If
, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. In this case, there is a continuum of equilibria in mixed strategies. All symmetric pro…les having a two-point support c 1 < c 2 such that there is a mass of 50% of 's between c 1 and c 2 , where c 2 2 [c L ;c], constitute part of an equilibrium.
The intuition for the non existence of positive commitment pure strategy equilibria is the following. Assume c > 0 is part of an equilibrium. A deviation to a slightly lower commitment level attracts votes from two groups of voters: all (low) 0 s for whom c is not su¢ cient to generate delay and so a lower c is preferable, and all (high) -agents for whom c is more than enough. Thus, support for the deviating candidate is overwhelming, with the extremes 'squeezing'the middle. Zero commitment is an equilibrium if the commitment technology is not 'too e¢ cient.' If, however, investment is very cheap (I (c) is very low), then zero commitment cannot be an equilibrium because a 'global' deviation to a large commitment would attract a majority of support. The proposition describes the mixed strategy equilibria in this case.
Collective Commitment with Centralized Choice
We now discuss the case in which the second period choice is also taken via collective action. Two o¢ ce-motivated candidates, 1 and 2, o¤er platforms x 1 and x 2 in the second period. From the analysis of individual choices, recall that (1) provides the second period optimal choice x(c; ) for any given commitment parameter c selected in period 1: From Lemma 1, x (c; ) is decreasing in . It is then clear that for any given choice of c in the …rst period, both candidates will choose to o¤er the ideal policy of the median voter M . Thus, the second period choice will be x (c; M ).
We can now step back and consider a generic voter's …rst period utility in this scenario.
Since x (c; M ) is …xed for all , the choice of commitment in the …rst period is driven by the desire to commit of an agent of median taste parameter M . Denote by c( ; M ) the (constrained) optimal commitment parameter for an agent of taste ; foreseeing the second period choice being determined according to the taste of the median parameter M : As it turns out, c( ; M ) is monotonic in ; with individuals who care more about future consumption preferring greater investment in commitment, as illustrated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Constrained Commitment Monotonicity) The optimal constrained commitment c( ; M ) is increasing in .
Not that the monotonicity in of desired commitment is in contrast with the analysis of both the fully decentralized scenario as well as of the centralized commitment with decentralized choice scenario. The logic for this is the following. The value of investment in commitment is now in reducing incentives for the median agent to cut the tree early. This is particularly valuable for the high-agents. The force behind the desired commitment level being decreasing in M is that marginal bene…t of commitment (1 M ) v 3 is higher when M is lower.
Lemma 2 implies that it is median preferences that determine …rst period choices as well. This is captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When both commitment and consumption are chosen collectively, equilibrium outcomes coincide with those chosen optimally by agents with the median taste parameter M .
It also interesting to highlight how optimal constrained commitment c( ; M ) changes as M changes. For the case of interior solutions we can show the following.
Remark Assume that @k(1;c) @x v 2 . Then the optimal constrained commitment c( ; M ) is decreasing in M :
The following example illustrates how the optimal constrained commitment and the equilibrium outcome work for the case of quadratic consumption costs.
Example 2 (Quadratic Costs -Fully Centralized Solutions) Consider the setting of Example 1:
Moving back to period 1 we obtain:
The optimal choice of commitment is given by:
where the positive constants~ 1 ;~ 2 ; as well as the coe¢ cients of the polynomials P 1 ( ) and P 2 ( ) (of degrees 1 and 2;respectively) are functions of v 1 ; v 2 ; and M :
As Figure 2 illustrates, the optimal desired amount of commitment c( ; M ) is increasing in and decreasing in M : Notice, however, that the equilibrium level of commitment is given by c( M ; M ) c( M ); which is not monotonic. We can now compare the level of commitment in the two collective action scenarios. When preferences are single-peaked and c( ) has a unique maximum, Proposition 1 assures that the platform c CD chosen in equilibrium corresponds to the ideal policy for a voter of type CD , where CD is higher than the median ; : The equilibrium choice of commitment is higher under full centralization than in the decentralized choice scenario.
When c( ) has multiple local maxima, the comparison between the equilibrium commitment levels generated by full centralization and decentralized choice is inconclusive and, in principle, can go either way.
We now discuss environments in which the commitment technology does not lead agents to have single-peaked preferences. As before, for presentation simplicity, we discuss the case of linear consumption costs, k(x; c) = cx.
In this case, incentives to vote for investment in the …rst period may be high for high individuals. The optimal commitment parameter c is either 0 or the c that is just su¢ cient to make the median individual choose consumption at period 3;i.e., the minimal level of cost that solves
In period 1, all voters such that (v 3 v 2 ) I (c ) or 's such that
prefer c to 0; all agents with lower 's prefer 0. Thus, there can be a broad consensus in favor of investing. there is a unique equilibrium with c = 0; and if M 2 ;^ ; there is an equilibrium with positive commitment.
In terms of welfare, there are two e¤ects that play an important role. First, some individuals (high 0 s) would not have needed investment left to their own devices, but are pushed to support non-trivial commitment so as to tie the hands of the median voter in period 2: On the other hand, other individuals (low 0 s) get to experience consumption at period 3 due to the e¤ective delegation of the timing decision to the median voter, when they themselves would have consumed at period 2. We return to this point below when we discuss welfare.
Decentralized commitment with Centralized Choice
We now consider the case in which individuals privately invest in commitment, but at time 2 there is an election that determines the time for consumption for all individuals.
Proposition 6 There is a unique equilibrium of the decentralized commitment, centralized choice case in which all voters choose c = 0.
The intuition for this result is that there is free riding in commitment investment. Investment in commitment is only useful if it a¤ects the choice in period 2. But, this choice is made collectively, and the probability that an agent is pivotal in period 2 is vanishingly small when there are many agents. This result does rely on the continuum assumption. In a world with a …nite number of voters more care would be needed. Zero investment in commitment would still be an equilibrium in the limit.
Welfare Consequences
We now turn to the welfare consequences of each of the political processes analyzed above. In the case of time inconsistent agents, the appropriate welfare criterion is debatable. We measure welfare as the utility of …rst period agents.
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Let be the threshold preference parameter corresponding to agents who are just indifferent between postponing consumption or consuming immediately in period 2 : v 2 = v 3 :
We denote by DD (G); DC (G); CD (G); and CC (G) the expected utilitarian welfare corresponding to the fully decentralized, decentralized-centralized, centralized-decentralized, and centralized-centralized systems, respectively, when the underlying preference distribution is given by G. We will at times abuse notation and drop the argument of the welfare function when clarity is not compromised. The following proposition summarizes the welfare comparison of the political institutions we consider. 
o is uniformly bounded below 1 and lim k!1 k M = 0; then there exists k such that for all k > k ;
o is uniformly bounded above 0 and lim k!1 k M
; then there exists k such that for all k > k ;
Intuitively, when the median is high, a centralized political process allows all agents to delegate choice to a virtuous voter who commits to e¢ cient actions at low costs. On the other hand, when the median voter is prone to a strong present-bias, collective decisions lead to investment in commitment and early consumption. In these cases, decentralized decisions do well. Government intervention does not help and laissez faire policies are best from a welfare perspective.
The quadratic costs example is useful in illustrating how the di¤erent political processes fare in terms of welfare as a function of the underlying preference distribution in the electorate.
Example 3 (Quadratic Costs -Welfare Comparisons) Consider the settings of Examples 1 and 2 above and suppose that G is a triangular distribution with a peak at d 2 (0; 1): Figure 3 depicts the welfare levels generated by the di¤erent processes as a function of the median agent's preferences when v 2 = 1 and v 2 = 3=2; and I(c) = 0:0005c 2 . 18 We use the fully decentralized setting as a baseline for comparison.The …gure illustrates the way that the four scenarios compare in terms of …rst-18 For a triangular distribution with a peak at d; the corresponding median is given by: Full centralization and decentralized commitment-decentralized choice have the same level of welfare when the median is above 2=3 because 2=3 = v 2 =v 3 for our parameters and in these cases no commitment is necessary to induce zero tree-cutting in period two. However, the decentralized commitment-centralized choice scenario is a lot worse for lower values of the median . When the median is lower full decentralization leads to the best outcome, with centralized commitment-decentralized choice a close second. The reason why the comparison between these scenarios becomes much more favorable to full decentralization for high values of median is that when the median is high there is no commitment in equilibrium, and, under decentralized choice, this harms the individuals with lower . One interesting aspect of the comparison among welfare levels is that commitment and consumption, are 'complementary': either full centralization or full decentralization generate the greatest levels of welfare, whereas partial centralization yields inferior welfare results.
It is interesting to compare the welfare resulting from our political processes and that generated by an economy that does not allow for commitment. Denote by S the expected …rst period utilitarian surplus absent any commitment instruments:
In the fully decentralized setting agents can always emulate the no commitment environment by choosing a commitment level of 0: Thus, whenever a positive commitment level is chosen by an individual, the induced …rst-period utility is higher than that absent commitment. Hence, the fully decentralized process dominates a decentralized one absent commitment, S DD : With respect to the fully centralized process, whenever M ; the centralized commitment-decentralized choice process yields zero investment in commitment, followed by individual consumption decisions and therefore equivalent to an environment without commitment instruments. In particular, S = CD : From Proposition 7 above, CC as well). When M < ; the relative performance of a commitment-less economy depends on the underlying preference distribution. If there is a substantial mass of agents with low preference parameters and the median M is su¢ ciently high, much in the spirit of point 2 of Proposition 7, S < CC : On the other hand, if there is a substantial mass of virtuous agents and the median M is very low, S > CC :
Let us now consider the potential surplus from imposing a commitment level of c (at a collective cost I(c)). In order to get a closed-form solution for the induced welfare, we now focus on the case of linear early consumption costs, k(x; c) = cx: We consider a situation in which, a social planner sets the consumption parameter cost c for the entire electorate: all agents experience the cost I(c) at the outset, but only agents who are su¢ ciently patient, with (c) =
resist the temptation to consume early come period 2: The resulting expected welfare as a function of the cost c; (c); is therefore:
As before, since agents in our environment are sophisticated, if they had access to private commitment instruments they would choose ones that maximize their period 1 utility. Therefore, centralized commitment decisions can only harm the quality of their individual utilities. In other words, max (c) DD .
We now inspect when a fully centralized process leads to superior outcomes relative to an environment with no commitment capacities. When there is a substantial mass of agents who can easily be tipped over to delaying consumption at costs that are fairly low, a positive level of commitment would be chosen centrally and generate superior outcomes relative to the world in which no commitment were available, as the following proposition illustrates.
Proposition 8 Suppose that
and I 0 (0) = 0 then for su¢ ciently low
Note that zero investment may be optimal even if I 0 (0) = 0: there is a …rst order loss in raising costs from zero because of costs that are born all the (low ) agents who will choose in period 2. This loss does not exist in the fully decentralized case. The proposition suggests that while the centralized political processes we consider can generate inferior collective outcomes, in principle, intervention (in the form of imposing exogenous commitment) could generate positive welfare surplus.
Extensions
Naive Agents
In the literature, when modeling time inconsistent agents, an assumption of naivete is sometimes made in contrast to the assumption of sophistication we have assumed so far. 19 Naive agents have preferences, but they believe that they will have standard geometric preferences starting tomorrow. Sometimes agents are assumed to be partially naive. This is modeled as agents having beliefs about their future selves that are intermediate between full sophistication and full naivete.
Most of our analysis would go through, with some modi…cations, if agents are partially sophisticated. However, it is useful to comment on what happens if some of the agents are fully naive.
In our model naive agents behave like time consistent (high ) individuals in period 1: they do not have any demand for commitment because they are unaware of their time inconsistency problem. Therefore, the higher the mass of naive agents in the economy, the lower the investment in commitment in equilibrium. However, once period 2 arrives, these agents are tempted by immediate consumption, lowering the e¤ective pivotal in the centralized consumption scenario. Overall, the presence of these naive agents reduces welfare for the sophisticated agents.
Alternative Voting Rules
In the centralized choice scenario, supermajorities to cut the tree early unambiguously raise welfare of all period 1 agents because they increase the of the second period pivotal agent. However, raising the of the pivotal agent in the centralized commitment scenario may be harmful because it can lower commitment.
Bargaining
We now discuss a case where collective actions are taken via bargaining. Assume …rst a two-person bargaining problem. Agent i has present bias i and discount factor i ; i = 1; 2.
The agents bargain over shares of a pie of changing value: if they stop at period t, they get to share value v t .
Proposition 9 Consider a bargaining procedure and a subgame perfect equilibrium such that agreement takes place immediately in every subgame. Then, the equilibrium of the game with agents with time preferences characterized by f i ; i g coincides with that of the game in which time preferences are given by present bias i = 1 and discount factor^ i = i i ; i = 1; 2.
The meaning of this proposition is that agents behave as if they were geometric discounters with lower discount factor. This extends to general changing time preferences: only the …rst discount factor matters.
An immediate consequence of this Proposition is that in many circumstances bargaining can lead to ine¢ ciently early agreements.
In these environments it is possible to construct examples in which an agent prefers a partner with high discount factors. There are two e¤ects: 1. The standard negative e¤ect of raising the discount factor of the bargaining partner is that this leads to a lower share of the pie. 2. Having a partner with high discount factor leads to later stopping. This is potentially valuable for a time inconsistent agent. High discount factor partners serve as commitment devices.
Analogously, it can be shown that bargaining frictions can be useful since they permit e¢ cient delays. In other words, there are circumstances in which agents have little incentive to set up e¤ective/smoothly functioning bargaining protocols since these would lead to ine¢ ciently early agreements.
Conclusions
The paper considers a simple setting in which behavioral agents, who in our case su¤er from present bias, are also political actors, electing the government that is charged with "solving" their behavioral biases. The main message that comes out of our analysis is that collective outcomes can be worse than those generated by a laissez faire economy in which all decisions are decentralized. While commitment instruments can be bene…cial to individuals left to their own devices, our we show the sensitivity of collective outcomes to the precise timing in which political processes take place and the underlying distribution of biases in the population.
When decisions are fully decentralized, very patient individuals do not require commitment to delay consumption, while individuals su¤ering from moderate present bias acquire varying levels of commitment that allow them to consume greater amounts at later dates. The starkest case in which government intervention can be harmful occurs when the timing of consumption itself is decided upon collectively. In this case, no commitment can be sustained and the political process destroys private commitment incentives. On the other hand, if the median voter is not prone to a strong present bias, a fully centralized process in which both commitment decisions and the timing of consumption are decided upon collectively can be bene…cial. Such a process allows the electorate to delegate decisions to a virtuous median voter. However, it is important to delegate all decision power to the median voter. Indeed, a fully decentralized economy is superior in terms of welfare to one in which only commitment choices (but not the timing of consumption) are decided upon collectively.
Our analysis also highlights the sensitivity of political outcomes to the commitment technology in place. Indeed, technologies that entail a …xed marginal cost of early consumption generate qualitatively di¤erent outcomes than those that do not. From a technical perspective, commitments that do not involve a …xed marginal cost of early consumption generate an electorate that has single-peaked preference with respect to the volume of commitment, while other technologies generate a greater wedge between voters'preferences (i.e., preferences are not single-peaked). ; there exists c > 0; such that x(c; ) 2 (0; 1) for all c < c: Recall that the …rst period's utility changes with c in regions where x(c; ) 2 (0; 1) according to:
Our assumptions guaranty that x(c; ) is decreasing in c; while @k(x;0) @c
Therefore, optimization requires that c( ) > 0 for all 2 0;
: Furthermore, since we assume that fundamentals are such that x(c; ) is well-behaved, c( ) is continuous. Now, if 1 G(
there is a majority of agents who prefer no commitment and the equilibrium commitment parameter is c CD = 0; which coincides with that preferred by the median. Suppose that 1 G(
For any parameter c > c CD , there is a strict majority preferring lower commitment, while for any c < c CD ; there is a strict majority preferring greater commitment. It follows that c CD de…nes the unique equilibrium commitment level.
If c( ) has a unique maximum, then there exist L ; H 2 0;
The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. We …rst show that with linear costs there is no pure strategy equilibrium with positive commitment. Assume by way of contradiction that candidate 1 chooses c > 0 with probability 1. Then candidate 2 can win with probability 1 by choosing c for su¢ ciently small. All voters with preference parameter such that v 3 v 2 (c ) prefer candidate 2 because they still get to consume in period 3 but the lower investment in commitment is su¢ cient to do so. Furthermore, all voters with such v 3 < v 2 c prefer candidate 2 because they consume in period 2 with both levels of commitment, so prefer the candidate who o¤ers the lower level. The only voters who may prefer c over c are those whose preference parameter is such that v 3 v 2 c and v 3 < v 2 (c ). However, because the distribution G is continuous, the mass of these voters can be made arbitrarily small by choosing small enough.
If
, then all agents with preference parameter such that
is convex, they prefer c = 0 to all c > c L . Furthermore, any 0 < c < c L is also worse than c = 0 for these agents because v 3 < v 2 c by the de…nition of c L and
, there is a majority in favor of c = 0 against all other c's.
, then all 's between H and L strictly prefer c L + to c = 0. Furthermore, some 's slightly higher than L also prefer c L + to c = 0. Since there half the mass of voters is concentrated between L and H , c L + defeats c = 0. As shown above, there is no pure strategy equilibrium with positive commitment. This establishes that when
, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
We now show that when L (v 3 v 2 ) > I (c L ) the mixed-strategy pro…les in the statement of the proposition constitute equilibria. Note …rst that c 1 and c 2 as de…ned in the proposition tie. Consider now a policyĉ > c 2 . This policy may win against c 1 . However,ĉ loses against c 2 because all agents of preference parameter > (c 2 ) (for some ) would vote for c 2 overĉ. Since
, there is more than 50% of the voters supporting c 2 . Thus,ĉ wins with probability 1=2. Consider now a policy c 1 <ĉ < c 2 . Such a policy may win against c 2 . However, against c 1 ; the only potential supporters are agents with preference parameters within [ (ĉ); (c 1 )); which by construction entails less than 50% of the population. In particular, c L is a policy that would lose against c 1 : Last, consider a policŷ c < c 1 : This policy may win against c 1 : Against c 2 ; its only potential supporters are agents with preference parameters (c 2 ) or (ĉ); which from the de…nition of the pair (c 1 ; c 2 ) account for less than 50% of the voters. Thus, the candidate equilibrium strategy pro…le wins with probability at least 1=2 against all possible deviations and no deviation is strictly bene…cial.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us …rst consider the case in which x (c; M ) is interior.
From the …rst order condition of the median voter in period 2 we know that whenever
Consider the e¤ect of c on an agent of taste parameter who foresees that period 2 decisions will be made by the median voter.
The …rst order condition for M implies that
and so
Now, if
0; all agents prefer c = 0 and the claim follows. Otherwise,
is increasing in : At a maximum, U 1 is (weakly) concave and the claim follows.
We now consider the cases in which x(c; M ) may be at a corner solution. Note …rst that when M v 2 v 3
, then x(c; M ) = 0 for all c. In this case, all agents prefer c = 0 in period 1 and the claim follows. More generally, we have
Clearly, there is no value in choosing c > c H ( M ). thus, c c H ( M ) and
Comparing this to interior cases:
If c H ( M ) is optimal for some^ , it has to be the case that
But then, this also holds for all >^ .
It is easy to see that it must be the case that when c c L ( M ), then the optimal c is zero: there is no point in investing anything in commitment if it does not help. In this case, the payo¤ in the …rst period is U 1 ( ; 0) = v 2 . Comparing this to interior cases:
If a choice of zero commitment is optimal for some^ it has to be the case that
. But then this also holds for all <^ .
Proof of Proposition 6. In period 1; all agents but the foreseen pivotal voter of period 2 best respond by choosing c = 0; as their choice of commitment parameter a¤ects only the commitment and consumption costs they experience, but not the levels of future consumption. If any agent of taste parameter 6 = M invests in commitment in period 1, the median preferences in period 2 would correspond to those of the median agent with preferences M and so investment by the agent of taste parameter are strictly sub-optimal. Suppose the median agent invests in period 1: In that case, in period 2 her preferences no longer coincide with the median preferences and so her commitment investment does not a¤ect ultimate choice and is thus strictly sub-optimal. The claim then follows.
Proof of Proposition 7. Notice …rst that when decisions are fully decentralized, agents can emulate the equilibrium commitment choices performed when commitment is decided upon collectively. In particular, Consider now any sequence of distributions fG k g It follows that for all k;
In particular, choosing " = Ũ v 2 E G k j >~ > 0; we get that for any Then, for all k;
Furthermore, since we consider continuous distributions, E G k j ~ > 0: There-
DD (G k ) < CC (G k );and the claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 8. Using (5), and noting that (c) < for all c > 0; the relative surplus from full centralization can be written as: 
Appendix B -Probabilistic Voting with Time Inconsistent Voters
We now modify our model by following Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and allowing each individual voter to have an idiosyncratic 'ideology'preference of Candidate L over Candidate R. We assume this takes the form of a random utility advantage x s F; with density f; determined independently for each voter (and independently of their time preference ). For presentation simplicity, we focus on the case in which early consumption costs are linear, or commitment investment is binary.
We consider equilibria in pure strategies. Suppose Candidate J o¤ers commitment level c J ; J = L, R. Recall that for any cost c of breaking the commitment, (c)
de…nes the threshold parameter such that individuals with (c) will wait till the third period to consume.
Therefore, the expected utility of an agent of type from commitment level c is given by:
where weak inequalities are speci…ed arbitrarily throughout as they occur with zero probability since G is continuous. Assume now that c L c R ; and notice that (c L ) (c R ): It follow that:
For any realization of the ideology advantage x; Candidate R is chosen if and only if
It follows that the probability that Candidate R is selected is given by:
Pr(Candidate R wins) = F (I(c L ) I(c R )) (1 G ( (c R ))) + (6)
and clearly Pr (Candidate L wins) = 1 Pr (Candidate R wins) :
We now look for a symmetric equilibrium c c R = c L : Consider then the …rst order condition corresponding to maximizing (6) with respect to c R : ; so that 0 (c) = 1=v 3 ; we get:
Recall that marginal welfare is given by Notice that when F is uniform, the …rst order condition coincides, up to a constant, with the marginal welfare (see proof of Proposition 8 above). Conceptually, whenever marginal welfare at 0 is positive, so that a certain level of commitment is e¢ cient, c = 0 is not part of an equilibrium and political competition would generate a positive level of commitment.
